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MOTIVATIONS FOR SUB-FRANCHISING IN THE RESTAURANT 
INDUSTRY: AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION 
Yae Sock Roh 
and 
William P. Andrew 
ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this research is to examine why certain restaurant franchisors 
utilize sub-franchising agreements while others do not. The research tests capital 
market, agency, and brand name capital explanations for the existence of sub-fran- 
chising in the restaurant industry. Proxies for measuring the franchisor's use of the 
capital markets, agency costs, and brand name capital are developed and 
described. Logit analysis is employed to examine the relationship between these 
factors and the use of sub-franchising. The empirical results are mixed. The results 
support the use of sub-franchising when the costs of monitoring franchisees are 
high and when franchisors wish to overcome weak brand name capital. The 
research found no evidence to support use of sub-franchising as an alternate to rais- 
ing equity capital. 
Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to identify what motivates franchisors to enter into sub- 
franchse agreements. Sub-franchising is a provision whereby a franchisor grants the 
right to a sub-franchisor to assume the role and rights of the franchisor in selling to pro- 
spective franchisees the ability to establish and operate franchsed units within a speci- 
fied regon. Simply put, the sub-franchisor becomes a virtually autonomous franchisor in 
the designated region. To date, the sub-franchisor's role has not been clearly defined in 
the hospitality literature and what motivates franchisors to seek sub-francluse arrange- 
ments is still an open question. 
mstorically, in explaining the existence of various franchising arrangements, capital 
market (Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1969; Hunt, 1973; Caves & Murphy, 1976) and agency theories 
have been emphasized (Rubin, 1978; Brickley & Dark, 1987). In addition, both of these 
theoretical explanations have incorporated the issue of brand name capital (Fong, 1987; 
Norton 1988a, 1988b). 
With respect to the existence of sub-franchising from the capital market theoretic per- 
spective, the same rationale can be applied as has been applied to general franchising: 
sub-franclusing (like franchising) may be seen as a more efficient mechanism for certain 
franchisors to raise capital (Matusky, 1992). Franchisors may effectively utilize the "fran- 
clusee's capital" to build units (i.e., let the franchsee finance and build the units) thereby 
eliminating the need for franchsors to raise investment capital for expansion (Whitte- 
more, 1994; Lowell, 1991). In addition, franchisors are able to obtain additional funds 
from other sources associated with sub-franchse contracts. First, a sub-franchsor pays 
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area development fees to the franchisor to acquire exclusive territorial rights. Second, 
sub-franchisors share the franclusee's initial fees and royalties with the franchisor. 
As another explanation for sub-franclusing, agency theory focuses on the efficiency 
of the incentive features of the franchise relationslup (Carnev & Gedailovic. 1991). 
Agency theory arguments suggest that while franchising may 
- - 
i i  general be an efficieh 
- - ,- - - - form of organization, it can also present a unique set of potential costs (Brickley et al., 1 
1991). Franchisors are interested in the performance of the whc 3le francluse system while 
franchisees are focused on their individual establishments. Therefore. franclusees need f 
to be monitored. When franclusors perceive that monitoring ir ldividual franchised units 
is difficult or administrativelv costlv. thev mav grant verhssion to the franchisees to 1 
I' I ' -  J J V 1 
own multiple units or even transfer the monitoring; duty to a sub-franchisor (Carnev & 
~edajlovic; 1991; Brickley & Dark, 1987). sub-franzhisiig may therefore be appropriate 
when the marginal cost of utilizing a sub-franchise contract is lower than the marginal 
cost of monitoring individual franchised units. 
From a brand name capital perspective, it has been suggested that a firm's tendency 
to franchise may be inversely related to the value of the firm's brand name capital (Nor- 
ton, 1988a; ~ a i e s  & ~ u r ~ h ; ,  1976). Likewise, the tendency to utilize sub-franch;sing 
mav be inverselv related t o  the franchise svstem's abilitv to deliver qualitv consistent 1 
w i h  the franchisor's brand name capital. since there is lithe in volvemgnt bythe franchi- 
sor in sub-francluse/franclusee contracts, reliance on sub-franclusing can make the fran- 
chisor vulnerable to quality chiseling; by its franchisees. 
L V 4 
This paper will explore whether there is empirical sup port for these theoretical 
constructs in relation to sub-franchising. The paper is organized as follows: Section II 
will review the literature pertinent to the theory of sub-franchising; Section I11 will pres- 
ent the research methodology, models, and data used in the study; Section IV will 
provide a statistical analysis and discussion of the empirical results; and Section V will 
conclude with a summaw and suggestions for future research. 
J VV 
Literature Review 
Capital Market Explanations 
The capital market explanation of franchising may also apl 3ly to sub-franchising as it 
- -  - 
depicts franchising as a vehicle designed to provide franchisors with financial capital 
when the firm cannot obtain financing due to imperfections in the capital markets (Low- 
ell, 1991). The financial resources supplied by each franchisee are viewed as an indirect 
method of raising capital that can then be used to accelerate growth and accomplish scale 
efficiencies and build brand name capital (Lundberg, 1994; Caves & Murphy 1976; Oxen- 
feldt & Kelly 1968-1969; Mathewson & Winter, 1985). A survey by Lafontaine (1992) 
reported that 76 out of 130 franclusers who responded said that franchising provided 
funds that allowed their firm to expand more rapidlv than otherwise would have been 
1 
the case. 
Jensen (1989) noted that franchising is a hybrid capital instrument which is differ- 
ent from capital raised through the public equity market. Stated differently, internally- 
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equity capital through the public financial markets and those that do not. 
Whether or not there is a relationship between a firm's decision to sub-franchise and 
its involvement in the public equity markets is a testable hypothesis. If sub-franchising is 
be observed among firms that do not have publicly traded stock. 
Agency Theory Explanations 
Mathewson and Winter (1985) armed that the costs associated with monitoring; and 
her contractual responsibilities. Since a franchsee's level of effort and performance is 
very difficult and costly to measure by the franchsor, profit-seeking franchisees have an 
incentive to take advantage of any unspecified elements in the contractual relationslup 
able elements of franchise contracts. the likelihood of a franchseeengaszing in ovvortu- 
The first problem is the incentive franchisees have to "free ride" on the value of fran- 
chsor's brand name capital at the expense of the franchisor or other franchsees in the 
same franchse system. The free rider problem is an agency problem that sub-franchising 
may help to alleviate. Franchsees can free ride on the quality of other franchsees witlun 
the same franchse system (horizontal free ride). Horizontal free ride problems occur 
when a franchisee does not deliver the guaranteed quality prescribed by the franchise 
agreement. With inferior products and service, the franchisee can reduce the cost of his 
individual operation, with savings directly transferred to h m .  In the meantime, costs are 
borne by other franchisees who do not engage in such practices. 
Given the possible free ride problem, Bricklev and Dark (1987) suggest selling exclu- 
from free riding. The sub-franchisor will monitor, control, evaluate, and analyze the sales 
would. This practice allows the franchisor to minimize agency costs with respect to 
bonding and monitoring the franchise system. 
"Under investment" by franchisees is the second significant agency problem that 
sub-franchising may help to control. Since franchisees will have more of their wealth 
concentrated in single units than the franchisor, franchisees may have an incentive 
typically takes place more frequently when franchise units are clustered together. For 
whensuch expenditures provide benefits to other nearby outlets not ownedPby the fran- 
alternative is to grant geographically concentrated exclusive oversight rights to a sub- I 
Sub-franchse contracts specify that a sub-franc.hsor becomes a residual income 
recipient in exchange for using the franchsor's resources. The agreements also stipulate 
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that a sub-franchsor is responsible for developing new markets and monitoring new and 
existing franchisees on behalf of the franchsor. In return, a sub-franchisor is entitled to 
the margin difference between the amount received from the franchsees and the amount 
helshe pays to the franchisor. Being a residual income-recipient, a sub-frai~chisor has an 
incentive to monitor and evaluate the performance of franchsees carefully. 
In the economic literature, the royalty rate has been widely approximated to explain 
agency theory in risk sharing (Cheung, 1969; Blair & Kaseman, 1982), and moral hazard 
and sharecropping (Stiglitz, 1974) . The franchisee's royalty serves not only to allocate 
risk and to motivate hard work, but also to direct the allocation of the agents' attention 
among their various duties (Lafontaine,l992; Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991). As such, 
agency explanations have led researchers to use the royalty rate to measure monitoring 
costs (Lafontaine, 1992; Wimmer,1992). More specifically Lafontaine (1992) indicates that 
the royalty rate will be invei-sely related to the importance of the franchisee's input and 
the difficulty in monitoring the franchsee. Since franchisees are the residual claimants of 
their own units, smaller royalty rates provide them with an incentive to exert greater 
efforts. Likewise, Wimmer (1992) suggests that as the need for a franchisor's monitoring 
increases, the royalty rate is expected to decrease. This would lead to the expectation that 
franchsors with a sub-franchise system could charge hgher royalty rates due to the fact 
that financial incentives (i.e., lower royalty rates) are not needed to insure that franch- 
sees conform to the franshisor's standards and requirements (due to the monitoring role 
played by the sub-franchsor). 
Labor-intensiveness also strongly affects the amount of monitoring in the restaurant 
industry. The amount of labor required by the restaurant differs from one segment to 
another. For instance, quick serve food operations heavily utilize mechanization to con- 
form to product standardization and generate economies of scale (Lundberg, 1994). 
Compared to full service restaurants, the simplicity and standardization of quick serve 
food operations reduces costs associated with monitoring and training unit managers 
and employees. When costs of monitoring are high, franchisors are likely to pass moni- 
toring problems to sub-franchisors (Carney & Gedajlovic, 1991). Thus, it is reasonable to 
expect that the hgher labor to output ratio of family-style restaurants may result in more 
franchisors relying on sub-franchising agreements to lower the costs of monitoring than 
franchsors of quick service restaurants. This also represents a hypothesis. 
Brand Name Capital Explanations 
Among the major challenges encountered by a franchsor is the need to maintain its 
brand name reputation. A primary purpose of a franchsor's brand name is to convey a 
message to customers about the quality and consistency of the franchisor's product. For 
instance, customers expect the same quality of food, service, and ambiance throughout a 
restaurant franchse system. Sub-franchising systems may increase the difficulty of main- 
taining the franchsor's brand name capital because of the minimal involvement between 
franchisor and franchisee. 
Since brand name capital is an intangible asset, it can be difficult to quantify 
and measure directly. However, several researchers have theorized and empirically 
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demonstrated that a relationship exists between brand name capital and the franchise fee 
structure, i.e., the initial fee and subsequent periodic royalty payments (Sen, 1993; Rubin, 
1978). Rubin argued that royalties represent the proportion of the present value of the 
intangible franchise resources that cannot be incorporated into the initial franchise fee 
(since the franchisor is not able to predict the franchsee's future profits). Rubin's argu- 
ments suggested that initial fees and royalties should work as substitutes for each other. 
Blair and Kaserman (1982) made a similar observation and stressed the financial 
name cavital bv makine use of initial franchse fees and subseauent rovalties. A com- 
strategy. In other words, the value of the franchisor's brand name can be derived by capi- 
talizing its stream of earnings due to initial fees and future royalty payments from its 
franchisees (Caves & Murphy, 1976). Thus, if franchisors that utilize sub-franchsing sys- 
tems have sipnificantlv lower brand name capital than franchisors that utilize traditional 
paid by a kanchsee will be lower for the sub-franchising systems. 
Research Methodology 
Data and Sam~le  Descri~tion 
mine whether or not an individual franclisor offers sub-franchise contracts and to obtain 
tracts. Initially, a sample of 136 fast food restaurants and 74-family restaurants were 
obtained from the Source Book. Restaurant franchsors headquartered in Canada and fran- 
chsors with only company-owned units were then excluded. The remaining sample con- 
sisted of 136 firms containing a total of 91 fast food restaurant franchisors and 45 family- 
style restaurant franchisors. Among these, 26.4% of quick serve food companies (n=24) 
and 36% of family restaurants (n=16) were involved in sub-franchise agreements. Table 1 
provides a breakdown of the sample. 
Table 1 
Franchisor w/o Franchisor w/o Total 
sub-franchisor franchisor 
Quick Service Restaurant 24 67 91 
Family Style Restaurant 16 29 45 
Total 40 96 136 
To test the prediction of a franchsor's decision to sub-franchse requires the assess- 
ment of the explanatory power of a single variable holding constant the explanatory 
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power of other independent variables. When the outcome variable is binary or dichoto- 
mous, the logt model is one of the most appropriate methodologies for solving the classi- 
fication problem involving two or more attributes (Gujarati, 1991). A logit model can 
identify a single model that is most significant in discriminating between the characteris- 
tics of franchisors who engage in sub-franchise contracts and those that do not. Logit 
estimation allows a comparison of the relative importance of the explanatory variables 
by delineating the differences in the two groups. Additionally, the use of a logt model 
permits analysis of the impact of a series of explanatory variables on the probability that 
firms use sub-franchising. 
The predictive ability of the model is measured by the percentage of franchisors clas- 
sified correctly. The classification of accuracy percentage is a useful measure of goodness- 
of-fit in a logt model (Maddala, 1992). Another indicator measuring the sipficance of 
the model, the likelihood ratio test, offers explanatory information on the strength of the 
model. For large samples, the likelihood ratio test statistic has an x2 distribution with K 
degrees of freedom where K is the number of parameters specified in the model. The null 
hypothesis can be rejected if hLR n x2. 
To test the variables related to the choice of sub-franclusing agreements, the follow- 
ing empirical logit specification is estimated: 
SUB= a + Pl STOCK + Pz ROYAD + p3 BRAND + p4 DUM + e . 
Where 
SUB :1 if a firm has sub-franchise contract, 0 otherwise 
a :the constant term 
: represents the sub-francluse likelihood coefficients. 
STOCK: 1 if a specific franchise firm has shares in the stock markets and 0 other 
wise 
ROYAD: Effective royalty rates 
BRAND: Brand name capital measured by the franclusor's ability to extract rents 
from the franchisees. 
DUM : Dummy variable: 1 if a fast food restaurant, 0 for family style restaurant. 
If one of the economic functions of sub-franchising is to provide a means of raising 
capital for franclusor companies, companies that do not access publicly traded capital 
markets should be less likely to subfrancluse. The STOCK variable indicates whether or 
not the firm utilizes publicly traded equity (as reported in stock section of NationS Res- 
taurant News). Therefore, the coefficient of the STOCK variable is expected to be negative. 
The royalty rate, ROYAD (as reported in 1993 Source Book), is measured as a percent- 
age of a franchisee's revenue. However, as in Lafontaine (1992) and Sen (1993), royalties 
plus advertising cost as a percentage of sales are used as a proxy for the effective royalty 
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rate. The rationale behind this approach is that franchsees have little information as to 
whether their advertising contridition is actually spent for advertising purposes. Since it 
is hvpothesized that the cost of monitoring is lower in a sub-franchise svstem, we would 1 
expect that the tendency to sub-franchise hould be associated with higher effective roy- 
alty rates. The expected sign of the coefficient of ROYAD is thus I 
As indicated previously brand name capital is measured by the franchisor's ability 
to extract rents from the franchsees. The initial franchise fee and present value of effec- 
tive royalties as a percentage of sales are summed as a proxy for brand name capital. The 
purpose of this variable is to capture the franchisees' financial obligations whch result 
from renting the franchisor's brand name capital. It is reasonable to assume that the 1 
u 1 
strength of a franchisor's brand name capital is positively related to hgher initial fees as 
well as higher present value of effective royalties. 
- 
In order to calculate the present value of the royalties, average sales of franchised 
units are calculated by talung the industry median total sales per full-time equivalent 
employee and multi$lying by the average number of full-time employees required to 
run a franchsed unit. Restaurant l n d u s t ~ y  Operations Report (1993)~ provided the data for 
median total sales per full-time equivalent employee. Brand name capital (BRAND) is in 
$1,000 increments. Since it is hypothesized that franchisors with strong brand name capi- 
tal are less likely to utilize sub-franchsing, the coefficient of brand name capital is 
expected to be negative. 
The variable DUM (1 if a fast food restaurant, 0 for family style restaurant) is a 
dummy variable that provides an opportunity to investigate behavioral differences 
between different types of restaurants as far as monitoring motives to undertake sub- 
franchise agreements are concerned. As stated previously the cost of monitoring is 
assumed to be positively related to labor intensity. A quick serve food operation is, in 1 
many ways, more like a manufacturing enterprise than a traditional restaurant (Power, 
1992). The systematic substitution of equipment for people reduces labor in fast food 
operations (Levitt, 1976) and consequently, reduces the costs of monitoring labor. On the 
other hand, family restaurants offer a variety of menu items along, with personal service 
and thus require more labor than fast food restaurants. It is reasonable to expect that the 
higher labo; to output ratio of a family-style restaurant encourages franchsors to rely on I 
sub-franchising agreements to lower costs of monitoring. Thus, the expected sign of the 
coefficient for the hummy variable is negative. 
- 
Table 2 defines the independent variables (STOCK, ROYAD, BRAND, DUM) used in 
the analysis and summarizes the measures along with the hypothesized direction of the 
relationship between the variable and the use ofsub-franchising. I 
Restaul-an t Indust~y Operat ions Report is prepared on the basis of financial and operating data 
supplied by members of National Restaurant Association and members of various state restau- .fl 
rant associations. 
Description Measured as Expected sign 
One if a firm is publicly traded Dummy variable 1 =yes 0= no 
STOCK on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ, 
zero otherwise. (-) 
ROYAD Royalty rates plus advertising Effective royalty rates 
(%) costs as a percentage of sales (+ 
BRAND Initial franchise fee plus present Franchisor's ability to extract 
(K$) value of all future effective roy- rent from franchisees (-) 
alties. 
DUM Dummy variable Type of restaurant (-1 
l=fast food O=family style 
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(0.13) of the franclusors with sub-franchise agreements raise capital through public capi- 
tal markets wlule 19% (0.19) of the franchisors without sub-franchised contracts are listed 
and without sub-franchise contracts 
Variables Sub (S) Non-Sub (NS) Net Difference T - Ratio 
NS minus S 
Stock 0.13 0.19 0.06 0.88 
Royad (%) 6.70 6.17 -0.53 -1.69" 
Fee ($K) 19.53 22.84 3.31 1.72" 
Pvroy ($K) 204.73 337.00 132.27 2.09"" 
Brand ($K) 224.28 359.85 135.57 2.12"" 
"+ Significant at the 5% 
" Significant at the 10% 
ROYAD measures monitoring cost. The mean value of the ROYAD is 6.70% for firms 
sub-franchise contracts. The second hypothesis predicts that firms with higher-royalty 
rates are more likely to sub-franchise. The sign of the royalty rate is consistent with the 
hvvothesized direction and ROYAD is statisticallv sisznificant at the 10% level. This sue- 
chat do not sub-franchise. 
- 
With respect to brand name capital, the hypothesis predicts that the dependence on 
sub-franchising is lower if a franchisor has a strong brand name capital. The brand name 
capital variable is statistically significant at the 5% level and supports hypothesis. The 
present value of royalties is also an important variable for distinguishing between fran- 
ence that 1s statistically sigruficant (at 5% level) and in the direction hypothesized. Tlus 
that the value of intangible assets (i.e., brand namLcapital) is associated with capitalizing 
its stream of earnings and is optimized by owners who combine it with other inputs 
(Caves & Murphy 1976). 
Logistic Analysis 
The logit estimate results, using 136 observations, are reported in Table 4. The predic- 
tion results are robust. The likelihood ratio test statistic for the loPit eauation is -75.62 and 
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Appendix: Final Model Estimation and Analysis 
In order to examine the effect of restaurant type on a firm's decision to undertake 
sub-franchise agreements, interaction terms between the industry dummy variable and 
each related variable were considered in a model of the following construction: 
Y = a + p1 STOCK + p2 ROYAD + P3 BRAND + p4 DUM + p5 DSTOCK + fi 
DROYAD6 + p7 DBRAND + e. 
In t h s  setting, the coefficients of P5P7 indicate the effect of the STOCK, ROYAD, 
and BRAND variables on the tendency to use sub-franchise contracts for fast food restau- 
rants. 
One of the problems associated with the addition of new variables of this type in the 
regression model is multicollinearity among the independent variables (Neter et al., 
1989). To quantify the existence of multicollinearity, the variables included in the model 
were tested using correlation analysis. A high correlation between STOCK and DSTOCK 
(r = 0.76), and DUM and DBRAND (r = 0.92) were found. Highly intercorrelated regres- 
sor variables can often generate illogical results such as instability in the size and sign of 
a regression coefficient. As a result, intercorrelated data may play a disruptive role and 
lead to model misspecifications. Hence, DSTOCK and DROYAD variables were dis- 
carded and only the DBRAND variable was added to Model 1 to examine if inclusion of 
t h s  interaction term significantly improves the power of the model. The interaction term 
DBRAND is equal to the product of the value of the DUM multiply by value of BRAND. 
Table 5 shows estimated coefhcients along with the log-likelihood and deviance for each 
model. 
When the interaction term DBRAND is added in Model 2 changes in the deviance 
(i.e., the likelihood ratio test statistic) is only 0.1. Comparing the results to the chi-square 
distribution with 1 degree of freedom fails to show statistical sigruficance. This suggests 
that brand name capital is an important consideration in the franchsor's decision to 
engage in sub-franchse agreements. However there is no significant difference in brand 
name capital effects between quick service and family restaurants. 
Motivationsfoi- Sub-Franchising in the Restaurant lndustiy 
Variables Intercept Stock Royad Brand Durn Dbrand 
Model 1 -1.560 -0.552 0.327 -0.002 -1.178 
(-1.97)" (0.91) (2.48)"" (-1.98)"" (-2.47)"" 
Model 2 -1.447 -0.4088 0.312 -0.0022 -1.3206 0.0006 
(-1 -641) (-0.674) (2.389)"" (-1.833)" (-2.004)"" (0.300) 
Table 5 
Comparision of models with and without interaction term 
Note : t ratios appear in parentheses. 
Model 1 : Log likelihood for logstic -75.62 *** 
Model 2 : Log likelihood for logstic -75.57 *** 
Likelihood Ratio Test Statistics (G) : 0.1 (-2 times the difference between the 
log-likelihoodof model 1 and model 2) 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
* Significant at the 10% level 
